In a regime of Free Trade and free economic intercourse it would be of little consequence that iron lay on one side of a political frontier, and labor, coal, and blast furnaces on the other. But as it is, men have devised ways to impoverish themselves and one another; and prefer collective animosities to individual happiness. John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1920 p. 99.
The number of countries in the world increased from 74 in 1946 74 in to 192 in 1995 74 in . In 1995 countries had less than 5 million inhabitants, 58 less than 2.5 million, and 35 less than 500,000. More than half of the world's countries are smaller (in population) than the State of Massachusetts. 1 In the same half century, the volume of imports plus exports as a share of world GDP, in a sample of 61 countries, has increased by roughly 40 percent.
Figure 1 displays a strong positive correlation, from 1870 to today, between the number of countries in the world and a measure of trade openness, the average ratio of imports plus exports to GDP in a group of nine countries.
2 Similarly, Figure 2 shows an inverse relationship between average tariff rates on manufactured products and the number of countries, in a selected group of countries for which tariff data were available. Tariff rates were slowly increasing between 1870 and the 1920's, while the number of countries was stable or slowly decreasing. After the Second World War tariff rates fell dramatically and the number of countries increased rapidly. 3 Figures 3 and 4 present scatterplots of the detrended number of countries against the detrended trade to GDP ratio, showing again a strong positive correlation between the degree of openness of the world trade regime and the number of countries. This paper argues that trade openness and political separatism go hand in hand: economic integration leads to political "disintegration."
We build upon a simple idea. Consider a model where the size of the market influences productivity. In a world of trade restrictions, the political boundaries of a country influence the size of the country's market, and therefore its productivity level. On the contrary, with free trade the size of countries is irrelevant for the size of markets, so the size of a country is unrelated to its productivity. 4 It follows that the equilibrium number of countries and the extent of economic integration are interdependent. 4 These ideas are discussed informally by historians of nation-building, such as Eric Hobsbawm (1990) , are tested by Alberto Ades and Edward Glaeser (1999) , and are modeled in a stylized fashion by Spolaore (1995) , Kashif S. Mansori (1996) , and . Donald Wittman (1991) also mentions this point. More specifically, this paper pursues two goals: Firstly, we develop an explicit model of geography and trade which endogenously derives the equilibrium number and size of countries as a function of the trade regime. Secondly, we provide empirical evidence for two critical implications of the model: (i) the effect of country size on economic growth is mediated by the degree of openness; (ii) the long-term history of country formation and separation has been influenced by the pattern of trade openness and economic integration and vice versa. In particular, we emphasize a trade-off between the economic benefits of size, which are a function of the trade regime, and the costs of heterogeneity resulting from large and diverse populations.
On the theory side, this paper links the literature on geography and trade with a recent formal literature on country formation and, in particular, a paper by . 5 It also relates to the analysis of economic integration and preferential trade agreements, but unlike the traditional analysis of trade blocs, we focus on the endogenous forma- -1903-1992) tion of sovereign jurisdictions. 6 Empirically, our paper is related to the recent literature on the effects of openness on economic growth, such as Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) , Wacziarg (1998) , and Ades and Glaeser (1999) , and the effects of openness on public policy, such as Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) and Dani Rodrik (1998) .
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section I presents the model linking country size to productivity and derives endogenously the equilibrium number of countries as a function, among other things, of the trade regime. Section II provides cross-country evidence on how the interaction between country size and the degree of trade liberalization influences economic growth. The last section concludes by discussing the relationship between country formation and trade regimes in history and in modern times.
I. The Model

A. Production, Trade, and Growth
The world is composed of W "economic units" (in short "units"), which are the basic entities carrying out economic activities. These units are not geographically mobile. They can be interpreted as homogeneous regions, themselves composed of one or more identical and geographically immobile individuals. A "country" k is made of S k units, where 1 Յ S k Յ W.
A unique final good, Y, is produced at time t in each unit i, using the following production function:
(1)
with 0 Ͻ ␣ Ͻ 1. X ijt denotes the amount of intermediate input j used in region i at time t, and L it is unit i's labor at time t, which is supplied inelastically. There is no labor mobility across regions. The markets for the final good and for labor are perfectly competitive.
Each region produces one and only one intermediate input (X it for region i) using an immobile, region-specific stock of capital K it .
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Each unit of region i's specific capital yields one unit of the intermediate input i. We assume that n ϭ W, which implies that every region can use the intermediate inputs produced by all other regions in order to produce the final good. Intermediate goods are sold in a competitive market within the region. They can also be sold to other regions, in which case costs associated with trade are incurred. We model these costs with the following standard "iceberg" assumption.
Barriers to trade:
When Z units of an intermediate good are shipped from region iЈ to region iЉ iЈ, only q(iЈ, iЉ) arrive, with 0
q٪ is a function of all the obstacles which make interregional trade costly. These obstacles can be geographical, technological, and political. In particular, costs associated with exchange across political borders arise because trade takes place between different political and legal systems.
8 A simple and useful specification of q(iЈ, iЉ) is the following:
where 0 Յ ␤ iЈiЉ Յ 1 and 0 Յ ␦ iЈiЉ Յ 1. The parameter ␤ iЈiЉ measures political trade barriers between iЈ and iЉ, while ␦ iЈiЉ measures physical barriers.
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In order to obtain a closed-form solution for the model, we make the following simplifying assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 2: ␦ iЈiЉ ϭ 0 for every iЈ, iЉ. 6 The classical reference is Jacob Viner (1950) . More recent contributions to this large literature include Paul Krugman (1991a, b) and the papers in the volumes edited by Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (1993) and Jacob Frenkel (1997 The first two assumptions impose symmetry in the model. Although they considerably simplify the algebra, they should not affect the qualitative nature of our results.
10 Assumption 3 is, in a sense, the definition of a country in our model: unlike exchange within countries, trade across borders entails some costs.
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We can now proceed to derive the equilibrium input prices and the levels of international trade at each time t:
Suppose that D it units of input i are used domestically (i.e., either within region i or within another region which belongs to the same country as region i). By contrast, when F it units of input i are shipped to a foreign region (i.e., a region that does not belong to the same country as region i), only (1 Ϫ ␤)F it units will be used for production. In equilibrium, as markets are perfectly competitive, each unit of input i will be sold at a price equal to its marginal product both domestically and internationally. Therefore:
where P it is the market price of input i at time t. At each time t, the resource constraint for each input i is:
where S i is the size (i.e., the number of regions) of the country to which region i belongs.
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Define:
The parameter can be interpreted as a measure of "international openness": the lower are the barriers to international trade, the higher is .
Equations (3)-(4) and definition (5) imply that, at each time t:
(i) The amount of intermediate input i that region i ships to any other region belonging to the same country is:
(ii) The amount of intermediate input i that region i ships to any other region not belonging to the same country is:
A Simple One-Period Example.-Consider the simple case in which, at time 0, each region is endowed with a given amount of capital K 0 (equal across regions for simplicity). Suppose that individuals in each region i only care about their own consumption in period 0 (denoted by C i0 ), and that countries have all equal size S. In this highly simplified setting, it is easy to show that both income Y and consumption C, in equilibrium, are equal across regions and are given by:
Note that in equation (8) output and consumption are:
(a) increasing in openness (for a given country size S); (b) increasing in country size S (for a given level of openness ), and (c) decreasing in size of countries multiplied by openness S.
As we will see next, these results generalize to a dynamic model, in which different regions can start with different levels of initial capital, and capital is accumulated over time. 10 A relaxation of Assumption 2 is examined in a previous version of this paper with no interesting changes in the results. 11 We are not pursuing here a distinction between a country and a customs union. For results on this point, see Spolaore (1998) . 12 For the moment, we are taking country sizes as given. We will endogenize the number and size of countries in the following subsection.
The Dynamic Case.-We now consider the case in which, while at each time t the level of capital in each region i is given, households can increase the stock of capital by saving. We assume that, in continuous time, the intertemporal utility function in each region i is given by:
Ϫt dt where C it denotes consumption at time t by the representative household living in region i, and Ͼ 0. We select log-utility for notational simplicity. All of the results generalize to any standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function (C it 1 Ϫ Ϫ 1)/(1 Ϫ ) with Ͼ 0. Household net assets in region i are identical to the stock of region-specific capital K it . Each household will maximize its intertemporal utility given its initial level of capital K i0 and the following dynamic constraint:
From standard intertemporal optimization:
As each unit of capital yields one unit of intermediate input i, the net return to capital r it is equal to the market price of intermediate input P it (for simplicity, we assume no depreciation). Using equations (3) and (6), we have that:
The steady-state level of capital is the same in each region of a country of size S i , 13 and is given by:
The steady-state level of output in each unit of a country of size S i is given by:
Therefore, the difference between the steadystate levels of income of two units i and j, belonging to different countries of size S i and S j respectively, can be written as:
Equation (15) In order to illustrate these results more clearly, we now examine the case of countries of equal size. When all countries have equal size S, the steady-state level of output can be written as:
͓͑1 Ϫ ͒S ϩ W͔.
As we have assumed away depreciation, output and consumption are equal in steady state: C ss ϭ Y ss . In equation (16) the steady-state level of 13 In other words, within each country, all regions will converge to the same level of steady-state capital, independently of their initial level of unit-specific capital. output is increasing in openness (for a given country size S), increasing in country size (for a given level of openness), and decreasing in size of countries multiplied by openness S.
Around the steady-state the growth rate of output can be approximated by:
Equations (11)- (12) and (16)- (17) These results are explored empirically in Section II.
B. The Number and Size of Countries
We now turn to the relationship between trade openness and the equilibrium number and size of countries. Consider the simple oneperiod example [equation (8)]. In this case, everyone's income and consumption would be maximized if the entire world belonged to the same country, so that S ϭ W. Analogously, in the dynamic model, growth and steady-state income would be maximized when S ϭ W. 14 This is an extreme and implausible case, since it ignores the costs associated with the excessive size of countries and the heterogeneity of their populations. Indeed, substantial costs may be involved if the British and Irish, Israeli and Arabs, Turks and Greeks, Tutsi and Hutu were to belong to the same country, with the same governments, laws, and public goods. We model this feature by assuming that each individual bears some heterogeneity costs h(S) which are a function of the size of the country:
While it is a priori reasonable to assume that heterogeneity is not decreasing in the size of a country, there are obvious exceptions. Relatively small countries can be very heterogeneous (for example, Rwanda) while larger countries, in terms of population, can be more homogeneous (for example, Japan). Equations (18)-(19) are a rough reduced form for a model capturing the costs of heterogeneity. For instance, provide a model where, as in equation (18)-(19), average heterogeneity in each country is increasing in size. In that model, a group of heterogeneous individuals forming a country have to agree on a common set of public policies. Individuals are uniformly distributed on an ideological segment, so that the larger the country, the larger the average distance between the common policy adopted and each individual's preferred policy. Equation (19) also assumes that the cost function is weakly convex.
The One-Period Example.-Again, we start with the simple case in which individuals only care about one period, and each region is endowed with K 0 units of capital.
The most general formulation for the utility function, defined over consumption and heterogeneity costs, is U(C, h). Without loss of generality, we assume that the utility function is separable in C and h. In particular, we assume that the utility of an individual living in country i is given by:
We focus on the case of equal country sizes. Given the symmetry of the model, and given the results in , the case of equal sizes is clearly the natural one to focus upon. However, we do not explore the possibility that other equilibria may exist, with countries of different sizes. We begin by considering the optimal number of countries (thus, the size S*), which maximizes the sum of individual utility, as if S* were chosen by a worldwide benevolent social planner. This optimal number of countries chosen by the social planner is also the number of countries that would be selected unanimously by referendum, if the world population were asked to vote on the number of equally sized countries in the world.
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The equilibrium country size S*, defined as the size S that maximizes (8), is implicitly identified by the first-order condition, as the unique solution to:
As the equilibrium number of countries is given by N* ϭ W/S*, we can state the following.
PROPOSITION 2: For any (weakly) convex h(S), the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the degree of openness .
A closed-form solution can be easily obtained in the case of linear heterogeneity costs, namely: (23) h͑S͒ ϭ hS where the parameter h captures the magnitude of heterogeneity costs. Using equation (23) we obtain:
which clearly illustrate Proposition 2: for given heterogeneity costs, the number of countries should increase with trade liberalization, an implication which we explore empirically in Section III.
The Dynamic Case.-A complete study of the equilibrium number and size of countries in a dynamic framework could quickly become intractable, especially as it should involve an explicit modeling of adjustment costs and potentially complex transitional dynamics. However, the analysis remains relatively simple if we focus on the "steady-state" number and size of countries.
Define the equilibrium country size S ss as the size that maximizes everyone's utility in steady state. From the previous subsection, we know that, when all countries have equal size and the economy is in steady state, C ss and Y ss are equal and given by equation (16). Hence, the 15 Note that in this paper, for simplicity, we assume that heterogeneity costs are identical for everyone regardless of their location within countries. 16 One can show that under mild, sufficient conditions, the social planner maximizing the sum of individual utilities would choose to create countries of equal size. The treatment of voting, however, with the assumption of equal country sizes, raises difficult technical problems, as discussed in . 17 Clearly, equilibrium size and equilibrium number of nations are positive integers. For simplicity, we will abstract from those integer constraints. 18 Note that this proposition holds for any
equilibrium size S ss is implicitly defined by the following first-order condition:
which implies that higher openness is associated with smaller countries in steady state.
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That is, Proposition 2 extends to this dynamic setting.
C. Unilateral Secessions
The equilibrium size S* derived above may or may not be robust to unilateral secessions. The latter can take two forms:
1. A subset of "units" or individuals from one given country forms a new country, keeping the size of all of the other countries and the degree of openness of the world economy as given. 2. A subset of "units" or individuals from two or more different countries separate from their original countries and form a new entity, keeping the size of all of the other countries and the degree of openness constant.
An important point is that the degree of openness is assumed to be given when regions are contemplating secessions. To the extent that "openness" captures the features of the world trade regime as a whole, this assumption is appropriate. The same assumption implies that any new country would adopt the same trade regime as the rest of the world, including the trade regime of the country or countries from which it seceded.
Straightforward, although tedious calculations permit to check the conditions under which S* is secession free. 20 In general, one needs to impose restrictions on the parameters of the model (W, h and ) in order to guarantee this property of the unanimous equilibrium derived above. These restrictions ensure that S* is not too large, otherwise unilateral secessions become profitable. In order to ensure the existence of a stable equilibrium, we assume that these restrictions on parameter values hold.
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The incentives for unilateral secessions will also depend on whether regions more prone to breaking away are receiving transfers from the remaining regions. The issue of interregional transfers is, however, not our focus here.
D. Endogeneity of Trade Barriers
Thus far, we have assumed that the degree of openness is exogenous, and taken as given by countries contemplating secessions or mergers. 
20 See the working paper version ) of this article for precise details on the derivation. 21 Similarly, , in a different but related model, show that the optimal number of countries may or may not be self-enforcing and secession free. In the present paper, the set of parameter values for which S* is secession free is large, and in no way "knife-edged." More details are available upon request. 22 In order to address this point, one would need a model with heterogeneity amongst regions and individuals. See and Bolton and Gerard Roland (1997) . 23 For an analytical treatment of this point, see the working paper version of this article and, also, Spolaore (1995 Spolaore ( , 1997 for why excessively small countries would be unfeasible, a "zero tariff" regime does not imply that the optimal size of countries is infinitesimal. In fact, being part of a political unit may facilitate trade, even in a world without tariffs. Hence, while an exogenous reduction in the size of countries may lead to the adoption of a more open trade regime which, in turn, would bring about a further reduction in equilibrium country size, the existence of cross-country trade barriers which are beyond the reach of policy implies that the resulting equilibrium cannot be characterized by infinitesimally small countries.
It is worth noting that we have always, until now, maintained the assumption that, while heterogeneity costs influence the choice of country size, they do not influence the benefits of trade. Suppose, instead, that heterogeneity costs across units also affect the propensity or benefits of trade. For instance, people may have a preference for trading with people who are similar to them. In this case, a reduction in the costs of heterogeneity would bring about, simultaneously, larger countries and easier trade. Thus, a direct effect of increased "tolerance" would run against, and partly counterbalance, the relationship between country size and trade emphasized in this paper. Furthermore, to the extent that formal or informal barriers to trade emerge endogenously from the heterogeneity of individuals, even domestic trade is not unrelated to country size. For instance, domestic (or within-country) trade barriers may be higher in larger, more heterogeneous countries, than in smaller, more homogeneous ones.
Finally, in our model, the number and size of countries adjust smoothly to underlying changes in the parameters; in practice, border changes and secessions or unifications are costly and lengthy processes. This implies that we may observe border changes only when the underlying parameters have suffered a sufficiently large change. Also, to the extent that border changes are less costly when many borders are changing, the process of country formation and destruction may be lumpy rather than continuous. The end of major wars provides a good example of this fact. In Section III, we show that, in fact, the process of country formation and secession was "lumpy" and occurred in geographical clusters.
II. Size, Openness, and Growth
In this section, we test Propositions 1 and 1Ј of Section I, which suggests that both the steady-state level of per capita income and its growth rate in the neighborhood of the steady state are:
1. Positively related to trade openness. 2. Positively related to country size. 3. Negatively related to country size multiplied by openness.
In other words, smaller countries benefit more from being open to trade than large countries, or, to put this in another way, more open countries benefit less from size than countries that are more closed to trade.
24 Throughout, we measure openness to trade using the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. This variable has the advantage of capturing a broad definition of openness, such as we have adopted in the theory. Namely, trade ratios incorporate both a policy component and a gravity component, as well as determinants of the degree of trade openness that do not enter the traditional definition of policy openness (differences between legal and political systems, language barriers, etc.). Furthermore, measures of trade volume are available for more countries than policy measures. 25 Lastly, trade volume measures are more widely used than policy measures in cross-country studies of trade and growth, allowing comparability of our results with previous findings. 26 We measure country size using 24 Previous research has provided some support for this hypothesis: Ades and Glaeser (1999) , with a sample restricted to the poorest countries, show that the interaction between openness and country size bears a significant negative estimated coefficient. However, they use per capita income as a measure of market size, whereas we use total income or population. Wacziarg (1998) extended the Ades and Glaeser result to a wider sample of countries. Finally, Athanasios Vamvakidis (1997) presents similar regressions, but uses policy measures for openness, rather than trade volumes, and also obtains a significantly negative estimate on the interaction between openness and market size. 25 For a discussion of the measurement issues involved in assessing the effects of trade openness on growth, see Wacziarg (1998) . 26 See for instance Sebastian Edwards (1993) , Vamvakidis (1997) , Wacziarg (1998) , Ades and Glaeser (1999) , and Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer (1999) . two different variables. Firstly, the log of total GDP reflects the overall purchasing power of the economy, i.e., its economic size. Secondly, we also employ the log of total population, which reflects perhaps more closely the political size of a country. The former is closer to the spirit of our theory, since it approximates more closely the size of the market.
A. Summary Statistics and Conditional Correlations
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for the main variables used in this section, averaged over the 1960 -1989 time period. Table 1 provides orders of magnitudes, while Table 2 provides simple correlations between openness, country size, and growth. Openness is positively correlated with growth, but negatively correlated with both of our measures of country size, which is consistent with our discussion of the relationship between a country's size and its own degree of openness to trade (Section I, subsection D). Table 3 presents a set of conditional correlations. Firstly, the correlation between openness and the growth of per capita income is equal to 0.641 for small countries (where "small" is defined by restricting the sample to countries with the log of population below the full sample median), while it is only 0.150 for large countries (large countries are the complement of the group of "small" countries). The same pattern holds when conditioning on different levels of total GDP. Secondly, the correlation between the log of population and growth is 0.454 conditional on openness being below the full sample median, while it is slightly negative (Ϫ0.116) for open countries. Again, the same holds when considering the correlation of the log of GDP with growth. These simple conditional correlations provide strong suggestive evidence consistent with our first hypothesis: namely, country size correlates much less with growth for countries that are more open to trade. Similarly, openness and growth are more tightly linked for small countries than for larger ones.
B. Least-Squares Results
In Table 4 , we present simple least-squares regressions for averaged variables over the period 1960 to 1989. For each measure of country size, we show three sets of results. Firstly, we present regressions of growth on a constant, openness, country size, and their interaction. These regressions are meant to capture the specification derived from Proposition 1Ј, namely the independent variables are viewed as determinants of growth in the neighborhood of the steady state. Secondly, we added the log of per capita income, measured in 1960, to the regression. According to the modified neoclassical model of growth presented is Section I, the interpretation of the other conditioning variables in this regression is now that they represent the determinants of the steady-state level of per capita income. 27 In other words, this specification is meant to test Proposition 1. Lastly, in order to investigate whether our results are due to the omission of other determinants of growth, not accounted for by our theory, we included other common determinants of growth in our regression. These included the ratio of government consumption to GDP, the fertility rate, male and female human capital, and the investment rate. To select these variables, we followed closely the specification in Robert Barro (1991) , a benchmark in cross-country growth studies. Throughout, the size of the sample was determined solely by the availability of data. That is, the sample size decreases as more variables are included in the regressions, as some newly included variables are available for fewer countries.
The results from these simple regressions are encouraging for our theory. The signs of the estimated coefficients are as predicted by the Propositions 1 and 1Ј: the interaction term bears a negative coefficient, while both country size and openness bear positive coefficients. While 27 See N. Gregory Mankiw et al. (1992) for the formal derivation of the standard cross-country growth specification from "augmented" versions of the Solow model. The relationship between "levels" and "growth" is well known: If y it is GDP per capita at time t in country i, we can write: log y it Ϫ log y it Ϫ 1 ϭ ␣ ϩ ␤ log y it Ϫ 1 ϩ other controls. This is the standard growth regression which allows for conditional convergence. One can rewrite this regression in levels:
log y it ϭ ␣ ϩ ͑␤ ϩ 1͒log y it Ϫ 1 ϩ other controls. the estimated coefficients on the latter are also consistently significant, the coefficient on interaction term is, at worst, only significant at the 13-percent level. In three of the six regressions, however, it is statistically significant at the 5-percent level. Numerically, the results suggest that a hypothetically infinitesimal country (that is, with a log of total GDP equal to zero), the effect of a 10-percentage-point increase in openness on annual growth is contained between 0.60 and 0.95 percentage points, depending on the specification. This effect falls in the range 0.12 to 0.30 when the log of total GDP falls to the sample median (equal to 16.049). Similarly, the effect of a standard-deviation increase in the log of total GDP (equal to 1.99) on annual growth rates, for a hypothetical closed country (zero openness), varies between 0.61 The same pattern holds when size is measured by the log of population. These orders of magnitude suggest that the estimated effects are large economically, and their signs are consistent with our theory.
C. Endogeneity Issues
Several authors have suggested that the estimated effect of trade openness on economic growth is biased due to the endogeneity of openness. To address this issue, Frankel and Romer (1999) construct an instrument for openness using exogenous gravity variables, and show that the estimated coefficient on the trade to GDP ratio in a cross-country income-level regression is actually increased when endogeneity issues are properly accounted for. The endogeneity of openness is a concern in the present paper as well, as discussed in Section I, subsection D. Furthermore, this problem potentially extends to the endogeneity of the interaction term between openness and country size. We follow Frankel and Romer (1999) in selecting gravity variables as potential instruments for openness and for the interaction term between openness and country size. These variables are likely to be strongly associated with the degree of openness, and unlikely a priori to be affected by reverse causation. We provide instrumental variables evidence largely to evaluate the robustness of our basic results. In any case, previous results by Frankel and Romer (1999) show that the endogeneity of openness is unlikely to be a major problem.
We focus upon the following set of purely geographic variables: dummy variables for whether a country is an island, a small island, a small country, and a landlocked country.
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These are mostly "gravity" variables that are widely used as instruments in the cross-country openness and growth literature. In addition, we added the interaction between each of these variables and the log of population to the list of instruments, in order to explicitly account for the potential endogeneity of the interaction term between openness and country size. Since they are pure geography variables, these instruments are unlikely to be affected by reverse causation with respect to post-1960 economic growth. To check this fact, we can perform Hausman tests for overidentification, since we have eight instruments and two endogenous variables. Tables 5A and 5B presents Hausman 2 statistics pertaining to the null hypothesis that the set of instruments other than the small country dummy and its interaction with country size are valid instruments. The results are not sensitive to which instruments are tested for. Specifically, the choice of other pairs of instruments as "benchmark" instruments in the Hausman procedure does not change the result: in all cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients obtained from an (inefficient) IV model using only the small country dummy and its interaction with size as instruments are the same as those obtained using the full set of instruments. Indeed, the p-values for this hypothesis are always greater than 68 percent.
Next, we checked whether the instruments are closely related to openness and the interaction term between openness and country size, another requirement for valid instruments: these are likely to provide little identifying information unless they are strongly jointly correlated with the corresponding endogenous variables. To investigate this, we regressed the three endogenous variables on the instruments plus the included exogenous variables in each specification of Table 5A . We then performed F-tests for the joint significance of the instruments in these regressions. As shown in Table 5B , for all specifications our instruments are indeed significantly associated with openness, the interaction between openness and the log of population, and the interaction between openness and the log of total GDP. This again suggests that the instruments do indeed provide identifying information.
The results from the instrumental variables procedure, in Tables 5A and B, are in line with the previous OLS results, which come out reinforced in terms of statistical significance. The pattern of signs, as predicted by the theory, is maintained. The magnitude of the coefficients on openness is raised somewhat, in line with results in Frankel and Romer (1999) . This suggests that the endogeneity issue applied to openness and the interaction term is unlikely to be an important source of fragility for our results. Furthermore, the use of instruments has increased the significance of some of the coefficients, particularly on the interaction term between openness and country size.
D. Levels Approach
To further establish the robustness of our results, we ran regressions using the level of per capita income in 1989 as a dependent variable (without including lagged per capita income on the right-hand side).
29 Although our theory delivers predictions for the growth rate of income [or, in neoclassical growth theoretic terms, for the steady-state level of income, see equation (15) and Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995) ], levels regressions constitute useful complements to empirical tests of Proposition 1, and may lead to reducing measurement error inherent in the dependent variable of growth regressions. As stressed in Robert Hall and Charles I. Jones (1999), levels regressions require a broader set of controls than growth regressions, since the source of variation previously captured by initial income now has to be accounted for otherwise. We address this issue by controlling for a wide set of covariates. Another important issue that arises with level regressions is endogeneity with respect to trade and the interaction term between trade and country size. We address this issue by using end-of-period income as a dependent variable and by instrumenting for the trade and the interaction between trade and size using the aforementioned instruments.
In spite of the difficulties associated with levels regressions, Table 6 further establishes the robustness of our main findings. Namely, the signs of the relevant coefficients are in line with the theory, although their significance has fallen relative to growth regressions. In the regressions without any controls, the coefficient on the interaction term between size and 29 In doing so we follow the recommendations of an anonymous referee. openness is insignificant, although of the right sign. Focusing on the regressions which include the greatest set of controls [columns (3) and (6)], both the interaction term between openness and size and the openness term appear with significant coefficients, while the coefficient on size is now insignificant, although again of the desired sign. Therefore, we take these results as providing additional evidence in favor of Proposition 1. Notes: Instruments used-small country dummy, island dummy, small island dummy, landlocked country dummy, and the interaction of each of these variables with the log of population. Heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Note: F-tests on the instruments from a regression of the three endogenous variables on the list of instruments plus the exogenous regressors in each specification (8 degrees of freedom in the numerator).
III. Discussion
A. Historical Overview
In the working paper version of this paper, we analyzed, in a brief historical overview, the evolution of trade regimes and country formation since the early nineteenth century. 30 We made a few points which we will only mention here. Firstly, we argued that the process of nation-building in the first half of the nineteenth century can be interpreted as resulting from the trade-off between the benefits of market size and the costs of population heterogeneity.
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Secondly, at the end of the nineteenth century the emergence of colonial empires can be viewed, at least in part, as a response to stagnant trade amongst European powers and to the need to expand markets in a period when protectionism was on the rise. 32 As a referee correctly pointed out, a colonial empire allowed the European powers to have large markets without having to bear too much of the cost of heterogeneity, since the colonies did not share the same institutions as the colonizers (and in particular were not generally granted the right to participate in the colonizers' political processes).
Thirdly, the pattern of trade regimes and country formation in the interwar and postSecond World War periods is consistent with the predictions of our model. In the interwar period, borders remained "frozen," namely virtually no new country obtained independence and, concurrently, international trade collapsed as a result of protectionist policies and the Great Depression. At the same time, colonial empires remained largely intact. Figure 5 shows the number of countries Columns (1) and (4): No controls.
Columns (2) and (5): Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, urbanization rate in 1970, distance from major trading partners, average number of revolutions and coups per year, and a set of dummies for whether there was a war between 1960 and 1985, whether the country was ever a colony (since 1776), postwar independence, oil exporting countries, Muslim majority, Catholic majority, Protestant majority, Confucian majority, Hindu majority, socialist country, Latin America, South East Asia, OECD, Sub-Saharan Africa.
Columns (3) and (6): Same as columns (3) and (6) plus fertility rate, male human capital, female human capital, government consumption as a share of GDP, investment rate.
Instruments used: Log of population, dummies for small country, small island, island, landlocked country, and each of the interactions of these dummies with the log of population.
Heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are in parentheses.
created and destroyed in five-year periods from 1870 until today. It excludes Sub-Saharan Africa, for which the identification of "countries" in the nineteenth century is somewhat problematic. The German unification, in which 18 previously independent entities disappeared, explains the dip at the beginning of Figure  5 . This figure also shows that very few new countries were created from 1875 to the Treaty of Versailles, while some countries disappeared. As was argued above, this was also a period of growing trade restrictions. The same figure identifies a peak, i.e., a large number of countries created with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. International borders hardly changed at all in the interwar period, until the late thirties, with the unfolding of the Second World War. In fact, Figure 5 shows that in the interwar period very few new countries appeared in the world.
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On the contrary, after the Second World War, trade restrictions were gradually reduced and the number of countries rapidly increased (see, again, Figure 3 ). In the 50 years that followed the Second World War, the number of independent countries exploded. As shown in Figure  1 , there were 64 independent countries in the world (outside Sub-Saharan Africa) in 1871, after the first German unification. This number declined slightly, to 59, until the First World War. In 1920, the world (including Sub-Saharan Africa) consisted of 69 countries. There were 89 in 1950 and 192 in 1995. As a consequence of this increase in the number of independent nations, the world now comprises a large number of relatively small countries: in 1995, 87 of the countries in the world had a population of less than 5 million, 58 had a population of less than 2.5 million, and 35 less than 500 thousand. At the same time, the share of international trade in world GDP increased dramatically.
We should stress that the increase in international trade in the last half-century, as documented by Figure 1 , is not the simple result of an accounting illusion. In fact, if two countries 33 Note that, among the very few new country creations, at least one, Egypt (independent in 1922) results from a classification problem: Egypt in 1922 was already largely independent from Britain, but its status switched from a protectorate to a semi-independent country. Leaving aside Vatican City, the only other countries created between 1920 and the Second World War were Ireland (1921) , Mongolia (1921 ), Iraq (1932 , and Saudi Arabia (1932) (although, again, Saudi Arabia was de facto independent since the mid-1920's). were to split, their resulting trade to GDP ratios would automatically increase, as former domestic trade is now counted as international trade. But Figure 1 only features the average trade to GDP ratio for a set of countries whose borders did not change since 1870.
34 Furthermore, Figure 2 employs average tariffs on foreign trade for a selection of countries with available data, a more direct reflection of trade policy, to display a similar historical pattern. Obviously, such policy measures are not subject to the accounting illusion either.
Finally, it is useful to discuss two recent or current cases of border changes. One is Qué-bec's separatism, in the context of NAFTA. An important issue in the discussion of Québec's independence is how this region benefits, in terms of trade flows, from being part of Canada relative to being an independent country in NAFTA. 35 In studying precisely this point both McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1998) conclude that, at least for Canada, national borders still matter, so that trade among Canadian provinces is ceteris paribus much easier than between Canadian provinces and U.S. states. This implies that there might be a cost for Québec in terms of trade flows if it were to become independent. Such arguments were made by the proponents of the "no" in the self-determination referendum of 1996.
The second case is that of the European Union. At first glance, the process leading toward European integration and monetary union could be seen as contrary to our argument, since several major countries are increasing their politico-economic ties in a period of worldwide trade liberalization. According to many observers, however, Europe will never be a federal state, in the usual sense. Instead, several countries in Europe will form a loose confederation of independent states, joined in a common currency area, coordinated macroeconomic policies to support this common currency, in addition to a free-trade area supplemented by a harmonization of regulations and standards.
In fact, while economic integration is progressing at the European level, regional separatism is more and more vocal in several member countries of the Union, such as Spain, Belgium, Italy, and even France. 36 So much so, that many an observer has argued that Europe will (and, perhaps should) become a collection of regions (Brittany, the Basque Region, Scotland, Catalonia, Wales, etc.) loosely connected within a European federation. 37 The motivation of these developments is consistent with our argument: linguistic, ethnic, and cultural minorities feel that they are economically "viable" in the context of a truly European common market, thus they can "safely" separate from the home country. 38 In other words, the nation-state in Europe is threatened from above because of the necessity of developing supranational juridical institutions, and from below because of rampant regional movements. These movements feel they do not really need Madrid, Rome, or Paris, when they can be loosely associated to the "Europe of Regions" politically, and be fully integrated in the Union economically. Newhouse (1997) puts it rather starkly: "[In Europe], the nation-state is too big to run everyday life and too small to manage international affairs."
An exhaustive discussion of the relationship between economic an political integration in Europe is beyond the scope of this paper.
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However, to the extent that we can interpret Europe as an area of "deep economic integration" rather than as an area of political integration, recent developments in Western Europe do not contradict the main argument of this paper.
B. Concluding Comments
We have argued that trade liberalization and average country size are inversely related. Thus, 34 Trade with formerly colonized countries is counted as international trade, so that decolonization had no "artificial" effect on trade volumes. 35 For an in-depth discussion of Québec's separatism and its economic consequences, see McCallum (1992) . 36 For a recent discussion of "rising regionalism" in Europe, see Joseph Newhouse (1997) .
37 See Jean Drèze (1993) on this point. 38 Interestingly this argument is often mentioned in the press. For an example pertaining to Scotland, see the Financial Times, September 16, 1998: "(...) the existence of the European Union lowers the cost of independence for small countries by providing them with a free trade area (...) and by creating a common currency which will relieve the Scots of the need to create one for themselves (...)."
39 See Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) for a more complete discussion.
the "globalization" of markets goes hand in hand with political separatism.
While this paper has emphasized the link from trade regime to country size, one may argue that the opposite channel may also be operative; namely a world of small countries has to adopt a relatively free-trade regime, because this is in the interest of small countries. The two channels are not mutually exclusive. Suppose that a certain region (say, Québec, Catalonia, Ukraine, etc.) considers demanding independence. Each of these regions takes the trade regime in the world, at the moment of their declaration of independence, as given. However, if the process of political separatism continues, and average country size declines, more and more "players" in the international arena have an interest in preserving free trade, thus reinforcing the movement toward trade liberalization that may have influenced their decision about secession in the first place.
An implication of this paper is that as the process of economic "globalization" will progress, political separatism will continue to be alive and well. The concept of relatively large and centralized nation-states is and will be more and more threatened by regional separatism from below, and the growth of supranational institutions from above, in a world of "global" markets.
APPENDIX A: NUMBER OF COUNTRIES DATA
Definitions
In most cases the determination of when a country appeared or disappeared is fairly uncontroversial. For example it is clear that the first German unification happened in 1871, that Algeria was born in 1962, and so on. In a number of cases, however, it may be unclear whether a country was independent or not. For instance, Afghanistan was under British "influence" for some time, but never became a crown colony. For such cases, we had to use decision rules to determine the number of countries in any single year. These rules are the following:
1. For most of the countries, the dates of colonization and independence are specified in Encyclopedia Britannica, so we used those dates. We also double-checked with Centennia, a computerized map program, whenever the data in Centennia was available. If conflicts occurred, we consulted countryspecific history books. 2. For a few countries, the process of colonization and gaining independence took a long time. We used the year in which a country lost control over its foreign policies as the starting point of colonization and the year that a country "fully" gained its independence as the year that it became independent. The word "fully" is usual terminology in the Encyclopedia Britannica and implies that the colonizer has left all powers to the local government. 3. If formal colonization did not occur for a given country, e.g., Bhutan, we used the criterion that its foreign policies was controlled by a foreign power as the starting point of colonization. 4. Countries that were under suzerainty of another country, e.g., Serbia and Romania under the Ottoman Empire, were classified as colonies. 5. A few countries, e.g., Afghanistan, were not colonized but were under the influence of foreign countries. They were classified as independent countries. 
